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THE SUPREME COURT AND CRIEINAL PROCEDURE*
By HoN. EDWARD S. NORTHROP**
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in the field of
criminal procedure 1 have been directed toward correcting a number
of injustices previously imposed upon the criminal defendant. In
striking down certain procedures, some of which have been long
established in many states, the Court has made some critics fear that
these decisions are stating new principles to justify the Court's distaste
for some of the practices, and that although injustices have occurred,
the Court has over-compensated by weighting the scales too heavily in
favor of the criminal defendant. It should be noted at the outset, however, that these critics, in voicing their fears, seem to view the process
of criminal justice primarily for its deterrent value and neglect the
punishment and the rehabilitative goals of the process. The resulting
apprehension is felt among prosecuting attorneys, law-enforcement
officers, trial and appellate judges, and members of the general public.2
In the hope of dispelling at least some of the apprehension (or frustration), this article shall comment briefly upon a few of the problems that
have been presented as a result of these decisions.
Partially responsible for the problems in this area are divergent
views regarding two of the objectives of our Constitution: to "insure
domestic Tranquility . . . and [to] secure the Blessings of
Liberty. . . ... Much of the recent criticism of the Court seems to

reflect a mistaken view that the two goals are mutually exclusive and
that the Court has ignored one -

domestic tranquility

-

to highlight

the other, rather than having sought to establish harmony between
the objectives. While the two goals may be to some extent conflicting,
* This article is adapted from a speech delivered before the States Attorneys
Association of Maryland, on June 11, 1965, at Ocean City, Maryland.
** United States District Judge, District of Maryland. LL.B., George Washington University, 1937.
1. Although there have been a number of significant decisions in this field in
the last few decades, by "recent" I refer primarily to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Some of the apprehension felt by members of the public may be due to misinterpretations of the decisions by those who gratuitously undertake to "explain" them
to the public. These gratuitous explanations are too often biased by the particular
commitment of the person offering the explanation to but a single aspect of the process
of the administration of criminal justice.
3. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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they are not mutually exclusive; the conflict can be resolved so that
both objectives receive due attention in law-enforcement procedure.
Perhaps a general re-examination of our goals is necessary, for
it may lead not only to the resolution of such conflicts, but also to the
realization that in its weighing of the interests, the Court is not
enunciating new principles. Whatever "newness" exists is due to the
injection of a new vitality into the Constitution, along with a fresh
application and a keener awareness of these viable principles. With the
present changes in the law and its application, the challenge today
facing the bench, the bar, the police, the law school and the public is
to understand the nature and significance of the changes. Only from
such an understanding can there be an intelligent adaptation to those
changes.
I.
Impeding the progress of this adaptation is the knowledge of the
fact that crime in the United States has been increasing at an alarming
rate. One source states that in the period from 1955 to 1960 the number
of reported crimes increased 4 times faster than the population.4 In
that same period there was a nine percent annual increase in arrests
of persons under 18 years of age.5
Combating this increase in crime has called for highly developed
methods of investigation. Today's policeman is armed with a greater
array of methods and weapons for scientific crime detection and has
at his disposal more advanced means of implementing these weapons
than did his counterparts of the 1920's and 1930's. His communications are better, his records more complete. Furthermore, the number
and scope of police educational programs have been enlarged greatly
over the last few years. Some of these programs for the training of
local police are conducted on the local level, while others are conducted
through the expanded schools and programs of the F.B.I. The fact
that the policemen of today are well equipped with the machinery to
apprehend suspects can be attributed largely to these factors.
As the police have become better acquainted with the improved
methods for fighting crime, they have, fortunately, gravitated away
from those activities which the Supreme Court has criticized for
decades. For example, brutality no longer constitutes a common element of police investigation, and we may assume that even in the
larger urban centers acts of brutality now occur relatively infrequently.
It would be remiss not to point out that much of the improvement
in police practices is due to the prosecuting officers of the states, who
have recognized that a large part of their responsibility as the public's
lawyers involves translating the dictates of the recent court decisions
and legislative enactments into workable standards that can be explained
meaningfully to the police. Since the public's attorney still may enter
a criminal case as early as the accused's attorney, his presence and
increased participation enable him to oversee the various procedures
used by the police at all of the critical pretrial stages.
4. 1962 UNIFORM
5. Ibid.

CRIMn RiP.
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II.
Although it once may have been the case that state-convicted
prisoners, allegedly deprived of constitutional rights, had little oppor-

tunity to contest their convictions in the state courts, this situation has
changed. Many states have enacted post-conviction statutes providing
prisoners with more ready access to the state courts.
Maryland was among the first of the states to enact post-conviction
legislation.6 Although as originally interpreted by the state courts,
the post-conviction statute limited the types of alleged deprivations
reviewable through this procedure, gradually the scope of review has
been enlarged so that at present it safely may be said that all alleged
deprivations may be considered on collateral attack in the state courts.7
That post-conviction procedures are a vital adjunct to our federal
system was emphasized by Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Case
v. Nebraska:'
Our federal system entrusts the States with primary responsibility
for the administration of their criminal laws. The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supremacy Clause make requirements of fair
and just procedures an integral part of those laws, and state
procedures should ideally include adequate administration of these
guarantees as well. If, by effective corrective processes, the States
assumed this burden, the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1958 ed.) would clearly promote state primacy in the
implementation of these guarantees. Of greater importance, it
would assure not only that meritorious claims would generally be
vindicated without any need for federal court intervention, but
that nonmeritorious claims would be fully ventilated, making
easier the task of the federal judge if the state prisoner pursued
his cause further. .

.

. Greater finality would inevitably attach to

state court determinations of federal constitutional questions, because further evidentiary hearings on federal habeas corpus would,
if the conditions of Townsend v. Sain were met, prove unnecessary. 9
In urging that the states accept their responsibility to curtail
abridgement of constitutional rights of the accused, Dean Griswold, of
the Harvard Law School, addressed the Cleveland Bar Association as
follows:
For, after all, the basic responsibility for the enforcement of
the criminal law remains with the States. The States are, or
should be, as much concerned with high standards as is the
federal government. The State should, in my view, welcome the
determinations of the Supreme Court that the high standards
prescribed by our Federal Constitution are to be taken seriously
and should be enforced. What is needed now is for the States
6.
7.
8.
9.

Laws of Md., ch. 44 (1958), MD. CODe ANN. art. 27, §§ 645A-J (Supp. 1965).
Cf. Hunt v. Warden, 240 Md. 30, 212 A.2d 276 (1965).
381 U.S. 336 (1965).
Id. at 344-45 (concurring opinion).
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to accept this responsibility, and to adopt means to carry it out.
With proper explanation and understanding, this can, I believe, be
done without impairing our enforcement of the criminal law.
When the States do fully meet this responsibility we will all be
better off, and we will more nearly have realized the potentialities
of our Great Federal form of Government.10
The willingness of the states to examine and correct possible injustices is a healthy sign of the meeting of responsibilities by each of the
governments in our system of federalism. It is pleasing that Maryland
has been at the fore, and that she has realized that the recent pronouncements by the Court need not cause disruption of the state
judicial machinery.
III.
Much of the interest in recent Court decisions results from the
changes to which those decisions have led," and from the fact that we
are now quite concerned with the increase in crime. To begin with,
the author does not believe that there is any causal relationship between
decisions providing for fair and decent treatment of the accused and
the upsurge in crime. Rather, the increase in crime would appear to
be due largely to the increase in urban population and the increased
complexity of urban life. Further discussion of this point is left to the
sociologists.
Second, the courts have been criticized recently for placing convicted criminals on the streets. This criticism is also unjustified. The
recent decisions have not resulted, as is often claimed, in turning loose
criminals who have been convicted in the state courts. The figures
which are available - the Maryland state courts do not keep such
records, so that federal court records must suffice - do not bear out
these fears. For example, in the District of Maryland, from July 1,
1964, to June 30, 1965, 214 petitions for habeas corpus were filed.
During that same period, 194 petitions were terminated. Of that 194,
162 were terminated without a hearing (3 petitioners receiving relief
of some sort), and 32 were terminated after a hearing (6 petitioners
10. Address given on May 13, 1965; quoted by Mr. Justice Brennan in Case v.
Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, at 344-45 n.7 (1965).
11. A recent article noted that, "To the great distress of law enforcement officials,
the Supreme Court will now reverse any conviction . . . which rested on the defendant's confession obtained by uncivilized practices. These need not even involve
physical coercion; mere mental tormenting is sufficiently obnoxious." Mueller, Of
Liberalism and Conservatism in American Criminal Law, 3 DuQuXsNr L. Riv. 137,

153 (1965).

I do not feel that the prohibition of "uncivilized practices" sparks great distress
among today's law-enforcement officials - at least, not among those officials supervising law-enforcement activities. The concern today is with police practices falling
short of actual brutality. It is in determining how much latitude the police should
be allowed during their interrogations. Also, it is in determining precisely the point
at which the various rights afforded the individual attach.

19661

SUPREME COURT

AND

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

5

receiving relief of some sort). Thus, of the 194 terminated, relief was
granted in only 4.2 percent.' 2
By no means does "relief granted" mean that the successful petitioner walks out of the courtroom a free man. First, relief may consist
only of the reduction of an illegally imposed sentence. Second, it
merely may upset one of several concurrent or consecutive sentences.
Third, where the original trial is found to have been defective, the
state has the option to retry the petitioner, and in most cases it does
so. For example, three of the six petitioners' 3 receiving some relief
after a hearing in this district during fiscal 1965 were retried and were
re-convicted at the new trial; a fourth is at this time awaiting retrial.' 4
The ultimate disposition of the other two has not yet been ascertained,
but one should not assume that they have been freed.' 5 Thus, even
those petitioners who are granted the writ of habeas corpus find that
their ultimate release often may be like the fruit of Tantalus - never
attained.
If the recent decisions do not cause crime or release convicts, what
do they accomplish? If the reader will pardon the trite observation, the
decisions give vitality to the proposition that both the public and the
accused are entitled to swift, impartial and complete justice. Of
course, that proposition is not disputed seriously. The disagreements
among judges and lawyers revolve around the content of that impartial
justice and around the means of attaining it.
In recognizing the interests being balanced and the ends being
sought, the observer or critic should become aware of the overall
development of criminal justice. To the extent that the recent decisions
are isolated and viewed outside of their context in the development of
criminal justice, the true impact and intent of these decisions are
missed. In failing to recognize the relationship of an Escobedo,'6
Griffin,'7 or Mapp'8 to the entire context of criminal justice, and in
searching back only as far as the holding of such a case, a judge or a
lawyer becomes more likely to misapply a particular recent decision.
When this occurs, criticism is justified, although the criticism should
be directed against the application of the recent decision and not
against the decision itself.
In a case arguably calling for the application of Massiah,9 Judge
Irving Kaufman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
did not mechanically apply the holding of Massiah to the case under
12. The above figures appear in Table C2 of the fiscal 1965 ANNUAL REPORT OF
This same table in-

THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OP THE UNITED STATES COURTS.

dicates that during fiscal 1965, 4,584 habeas corpus petitions were terminated in all
districts, with some relief granted in 154, or 3.1% of the cases.
13. Docket numbers in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland are 14473, 14702, and 14753.
14. Docket number 15636.
15. Nor should it be assumed that the successful petitioner fares better - or even
as well - on his sentence at the second trial. See the excellent discussion of the
implications of retrials with possibly harsher sentences in Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALX L.J. 606 (1965).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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review, but instead related it to the interests being balanced and to
his view of our system of criminal justice:
At least from the time of Powell v. Alabama,... American courts
have recognized that a society which denies the assistance of
counsel to a defendant at a crucial stage in a criminal proceeding
cannot be assured that fair and impartial justice - the indispensable objective of any judicial system - has truly been
achieved. Although the road has not been without its detours,
the Supreme Court's decisions in [Gideon and Massiah] . . . have
gone far to redress the balance between an often impoverished and
generally untutored defendant and the seemingly all-powerful
state, with its battery of trained attorneys and its complement of
experienced investigators. But if, at times, society's interest in
bringing the guilty to justice has necessarily been subordinated
to its concern for protecting the innocent or maintaining the
integrity of [its] police, prosecutorial and judicial machinery,
that interest has never been - and in a civilized society can
never be - entirely forgotten. The day has certainly not come
when courts will set a convicted criminal free for no reason other
than that some practice of police or prosecution - wholly unrelated to the conviction itself - did not meet with their approval.
If that unhappy day should ever arrive, the often-heard criticism
that law and lawyers are interested only in "technicalities" will
have a ring of truth, and courts may rightfully be accused of
exalting form above substance. We cannot believe that the
Courts which decided Powell and Gideon and Massiah, decisions
which touched at the core of our adversary system, were concerned
only with technicalities of form or legal niceties. The opinion in
those cases, rather, reflected an intense belief that the rules which
they established were vital if the fundamental rights safeguarded
by our Constitution were to become a living reality. They were
designed to ensure that a defendant unequipped or not permitted
to engage counsel would not suffer for that reason; they were not
intended merely to provide a defendant ....
whose interrogation
without counsel contributed in no way to his conviction, with a
technical means to vitiate a fair trial. If we were mechanically to
invoke Massiah to reverse [the particular conviction under consideration] .... we would transform a meaningful expression of
concern for the rights of the individual into a meaningless
mechanism for the obstruction of justice.2"
It is submitted that this approach is the correct one and should be
recognized by lawyers and laymen as setting forth the real basis of
recent Supreme Court pronouncements.
It must be remembered that the Court is trying to achieve or
maintain a balance between individual and societal rights, or as
stated earlier, between domestic tranquility and the blessings of liberty.
20. United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379

U.S. 936 (1964).
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Concern for that balance has led to an interesting exchange of letters
between Chief Judge David Bazelon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia and Attorney General Katzenbach.2 ' Judge
Bazelon was critical of certain provisions contained in Preliminary
Draft Number 1 of the proposed American Law Institute Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. The provisions allowing questioning
by police for from four to twenty-four hours would, he felt, "primarily
affect the poor and, in particular, the poor Negro citizen." He doubted,
for example, that the police would arrest the board of directors of a
corporation which was suspected of criminal anti-trust activities.
Attorney General Katzenbach found this objection "particularly
irrelevant." The differences in treatment between the "poor" and the
"directors" are justified in view of the nature of the crimes each is
likely to have committed; one who has just committed a burglary or an
armed robbery is more likely to flee or to harm others while on the
street than is one who has engaged in criminal anti-trust activities.

Poverty happens to be a breeding ground for crime. For that reason,
police activities are more likely to affect the poor than the rich.
The police are more involved with the poor because they must go
where the crime is, not because they intentionally discriminate against
the poor. The separation of the guilty from the innocent is still a goal
of criminal justice, and this is the only discrimination that is sought
to be made. Fortunately, however, neither Judge Bazelon nor Attorney
General Katzenbach foresees a complete breakdown of either domestic
tranquility or law and order, although Attorney General Katzenbach
does admit to a danger of moving in the direction of a breakdown in
enforcement since "absolute equality of result could be achieved in
the interrogatory stage . . . only by deliberately foregoing reliable

evidence and releasing guilty men."' 22
IV.

In a climate of an increasing rate of crime, the courts, including
the Supreme Court, often are at least partially responsible for whatever
fear of possible repercussions has been engendered by the recent decisions. Much of that fear exists not because of that which the courts
have said, but because of what they have left unsaid. That is, much of
the frustration felt by prosecutors, police, and the lower courts is not
so much the result of a changing standard as it is with the failure to
articulate a meaningful standard capable of consistent application.
This is not to imply that all doubt or uncertainty can be removed,
that a decision with the significance of Escobedo, Gideon, Massiah,
Griffin, or Mapp could have been crystal-clear when rendered. But a
large part of the uncertainty could have been obviated and many problems could have been anticipated and avoided.
For example, the important question of the retroactivity of Mapp
was not resolved by the Court in that case. Thus, the lower courts were
21. The full text of those letters appears in the Washington Evening Star, August
4, 1965, § A, pp. 4-5.
22. Id. at 4.
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without any guidance whatsoever when hearing collateral attacks upon
convictions finalized prior to Mapp. Having little precedent for such
an issue, the courts were forced to rely largely upon conjecture. The
conflict among the circuits2 3 became marked enough to cast doubt upon
the efficacy of the judicial process.
In settling the issue by finding Mapp to be prospective only, the
Court did much to answer or perhaps placate one fear of Mr. Justice
White, who in his dissent in Escobedo implied that the Court was
predisposed in favor of criminals and that it distrusted police action.24
The decision in Linkletter v. Walker2 5 shows clearly that the Court is
mindful of the necessity to weigh alternatives rather than to concern
itself with only one factor:
[W]e must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule.., and the effect
on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of
Mapp....
Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within
its rights. This, it was found, was the only effective deterrence
to lawless police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf
requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the
necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action ...
We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the
rule retrospective. The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp
has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the
prisoners involved. Nor would it add harmony to the delicate
state-federal relationship of which we have spoken as part and
parcel of the purpose of Mapp. Finally, the ruptured privacy
of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation
comes too late....
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the
rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice
to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the excludability
of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated. If it
is excluded, the witnesses available at the time of the original
trial will not be available or if located their memory will be dimmed.
To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that
has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration
of justice.2"
23. "About the only point upon which there was agreement . . . was that our
opinion in Mapp did not foreclose the question." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
620 n.2 (1965). The cases and commentators taking both sides of the retroactivity
question are collected in that footnote.
24. "This [decision in Escobedo] . . . is perhaps thought to be a necessary safeguard against the possibility of extorted confessions. To this extent it reflects a
deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers everywhere ..... " Mr. Justice White,
dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, at 498 (1964).
25. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
26. Id. at 636-38.

1966]

SUPREME

COURT AND

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

9

Now that Linkletter has been decided, the critics may have reason
to realign their thoughts with respect to the Court's position in this
area. As it has turned out, some of the criticism was without merit;
also, the criticism may have been damaging, for in anticipating the
end of effective law enforcement the critics have aroused fears to an
intensity difficult for even a Linkletter to allay.
The Supreme Court could have avoided the confusion and conflicts which obviously were to follow by determining the retroactivity
issue when it rendered the Mapp decision. For example, in Jackson v.
Denno,' Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, stated:
It is both practical and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter
a proper determination of voluntariness be made prior to the
admission of the confession to the jury which is adjudicating guilt
or innocence. But as to Jackson, who has already been convicted
and now seeks collateral relief, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires a new trial if in a soundly conducted collateral proceeding,
the confession ... is fairly determined to be voluntary.... ."
That statement left no running room for judges inclined to extend the
mandates of the Court.
The turmoil caused by the Escobedo decision is even more severe,
for it raises many more questions and leaves them unanswered. For
example: (1) Must there be a request for counsel in order for Escobedo
to apply? (2) Is this issue dependent upon whether the fifth or the
sixth amendment applies? (3) Do both of the amendments apply,
and if so, in different proportions? (4) If Escobedo vindicates a fifth
amendment right, does the denial of a request for counsel ipso facto
characterize any confession thereafter obtained as involuntary, or
must consideration be given to the totality of circumstances? (5) When
does the investigative process reach the accusatory stage? (6) Assuming that only a sixth amendment right is involved, is the turning
point from an investigative process to the accusatory stage to be taken
as the first of the "critical stages" at which the sixth amendment
rights attach? (7) Do the sixth amendment rights only attach when
for all practical purposes formal judicial proceedings have been
initiated?29 (8) Are the points in time described in the last two questions the same? (9) Is the decision to be applied retroactively?3"
This paper does not purport to answer all of these questions, but
will illustrate how, with respect to one or two of them, the Court could
have provided more guidance and perhaps avoided much of the criticism
and confusion.
27. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
28. Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added).
29. "Petitioner had, for the all practical purposes, already been charged with
murder." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, at 486 (1964).
30. The Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in four Escobedo-type cases,
and these questions soon will receive a definitive answer. Vignera v. New York,
15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527 (1965), cert. granted, 86 S.Ct. 320 (1965) ; Johnson v.
New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965), cert. granted, 86 S.Ct. 318 (1965) ;
Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 86 S.Ct. 318
(1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965), cert. granted, 86 S.Ct
320 (1965).
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On its peculiar facts, Escobedo vindicates a sixth amendment
right. Indeed, the Court so stated.3 ' But the factors resulting in the
denial of a sixth amendment right also might have established a violation of the fifth amendment. Where a suspect has requested counsel,
it seems that the denial of the request may be viewed as having a coercive effect. Also, the denial serves to illustrate to the court that the
suspect is in a hostile environment and that he had better cooperate.
Where the request has not been made, this objective indication of
hostility - the denial - is lacking. 32 If the request and subsequent
denial are crucial to the Escobedo holding, an ipso facto test of coercion has been established; but the ipso facto nature of the test is
necessary if the case, viewed as involving fifth amendment rights, is
to be given efficacy.
But even if the case is viewed only as a sixth amendment case, it
would seem that there must still be a request, for the denial of the
request indicates to the courts that a critical stage has been reached.
The denial of the request for counsel, made by one in custody, is an
objective indication that a general investigation has reached the
accusatory stage, or that "for all practical purposes, [the suspect has]
already been charged with murder. ' 33 Since the sixth amendment
rights serve to protect the innocent, the denial of a request for counsel
becomes an important factor; although every moment in police custody
will be viewed as part of the accusatory process by one who has actually
committed the crime being investigated, the suspect who in actuality is
innocent, although understandably indignant at being detained, will
more likely feel "accused" when his legitimate request for counsel has
been denied. Thus, the request should be made in either case.
The jurisdictions are split on the necessity for a request, just as
they had been split on the retroactivity of Mapp. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit3 4 and the Supreme Court of
California 5 have decided that a request need not be made for Escobedo
to apply. 6 While the issue remains unsettled, uniformity will not be
31. See 378 U.S. at 490-91, where the Court declared:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel"
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ...
32. Very brief mention should be made of the English practice with respect to the
interrogation system. In spite of the Judges' Rules in that country limiting questioning, the fruits of such questioning - namely, confessions - seldom are held
inadmissible. See Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, 1960 CRIM. L. Rgv. 325, 331-32, cited by Mr. Justice White, dissenting in
Escobedo; see generally McCORmicK, EvIDENC4 §§ 116, 119 (1954).
33. 378 U.S. at 486.
34. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), rehearing denied (Oct.
13, 1965).
35. People v. Dorado,62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937 (1965).
36. The justification of the cases holding that no request is necessary seems to be
that to require a request discriminates against those unaware of their rights and in
favor of those who, while possibly knowledgable of their rights, still confess. But
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achieved. Witness the situation in Pennsylvania, where the highest
court of that state believed that a request was necessary. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed. Faced with the position of
the Third Circuit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court retreated - not
because of persuasion, but to foster comity:
If the Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by its [the Third
Circuit's] conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny
relief need only "walk across the street" to gain a different result.
Such an unfortunate situation would cause disrespect for the
law....

Consequently, in order to alleviate and correct a regrettable
situation, the clear indication for this court is to accept and follow the decision of the Third Circuit on this matter until some fur37
ther word is spoken by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The reaction of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was unlike that of
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey will continue to require a request until
38
told differently by the Supreme Court.
Of course, one cannot be certain how the Supreme Court will rule
on the request issue. Should the Court rule that a request is necessary,
it will indeed be unfortunate that the Court did not see fit to indicate
this clearly when it decided Escobedo. For example, in his excellent
dissent, Mr. Justice White was quite disturbed that the effect of
Escobedo would be to bar any admission made to the police unless the
accused had waived the right to counsel; his fear was that the voluntariness test had been abandoned.3 9 If the Court views the denial as coercive, however, the voluntariness test has not been abandoned, and
Mr. Justice White's fears are not justified. Had the Court indicated its
position, it would have been somewhat safer from attack by Mr. Justice
White.
Whether Escobedo requires retroactive application has likewise
led to disagreement. Although the decision has been applied retroactively in a few instances, since the decision in Linkletter no reported
case has specifically applied Escobedo retroactively. The issue, however, is by no means settled. As the Supreme Court has agreed to
decide the issue, comments on what the Court's decision will or should
be with respect to the retroactivity of Escobedo must await the Court's
maintaining the requirement for a request also discriminates against the guilty
(unless the reliability of the confession is to be challenged). Again, the interests
must be balanced. I would point out, however, that the entire process of criminal
justice to some extent discriminates against the ignorant or against those unable
to employ the best counsel. Should one foolish enough to leave fingerprints at the
scene of his crime have that evidence excluded because his smarter counterpart would
not have left fingerprints? See Attorney General Katzenbach's response to Judge
Bazelon, where he argues that the "informed" gangster who avoids conviction with
the help of expensive lawyers should not be set up as our standard.
37. Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
38. State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965).
39. "The decision is thus another major step in the direction of the goal which
the Court seemingly has in mind - to bar from evidence all admissions obtained
from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not.
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determination in Johnson v. New Jersey.4 0 Whatever the determination shall be, it is unfortunate that the original decision did not contain an additional sentence indicating whether the principles announced
were to apply in all cases or only with respect to convictions finalized
thereafter.
The Court, of course, cannot resolve every issue and foresee every
possible implication of each of its decisions. Indeed, a laudable characteristic of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that court decisions apply
to the specific facts involved, and peripheral matters must await future
cases, so that what would in a given case be obiter dicta may become
the holding of a subsequent case. But, recognizing that it is the
Supreme Court which ultimately must resolve the uncertainty of a
Mapp or an Escobedo, lower courts might still better promote uniformity by applying and not expanding the Supreme Court decisions.
For example, until the Court definitely indicates that a certain decision
is to be applied retroactively, the lower courts should not apply the
decision retroactively.
Of course, there are areas of doubt even when a judge attempts to
limit a decision to its facts. There is the often-difficult determination
of just which facts in the controlling decision are the operative facts.
But disagreements among judges and lawyers over which facts are
controlling are less likely to lead to unwarranted expansion, and the
concomitant criticism, than trying to "second guess" the Supreme
Court.

V.
In concluding, it is suggested that the bar and the law schools
might assume even greater responsibility for the protection of society
and the accused. The members of the bar can help all of us to operate
under the recent decisions by relating these decisions to the larger goals
of our society. The collective activities of the bar, through the educational programs of the Associations, are most helpful in this respect.
Finally, the law schools, by expanding their programs, can provide
greater participation in the field of criminal law for their students.
Presently, in a few states, law students are permitted by court rule to
assist practicing attorneys in the defense of indigents." The School of
Law of the University of Maryland has sponsored a student organization, working under faculty supervision, that undertakes research of
difficult areas of the criminal law when so requested by the attorney
involved in the case. Such programs provide the student with an
experience in facing the practical problems of the administration of
criminal justice at that point in his career when such contact can serve
him best.
40. 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737, cert. granted, 86 S.Ct. 318 (1965).
41. See Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright on the
States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1965).

